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Abstract: Secure data mining has emerged as an essential requirement for exchanging confidential data in terms of
third party (outsourced) data analytics. An emerging form of encryption, Homomorphic Encryption, allows
a limited amount of data manipulation and, when coupled with additional information, can facilitate secure
third party data analytics. However, the resource required is substantial which leads to scalability issues.
Moreover, in many cases, data owner participation can still be significant, thus not providing a full realisation
of the vision of third party data analytics. The focus of this paper is therefore scalable and secure third
party data clustering with only very limited data owner participation. To this end, the concept of Secure Chain
Distance Matrices is proposed. The mechanism is fully described and analysed in the context of three different
clustering algorithms. Excellent evaluation results were obtained.
1 INTRODUCTION
Data mining is a well established research field
that has been effectively employed in many disci-
plines. However, the exponential growth in data avail-
ability has lead to the involvement of third parties
for the purpose of storing and processing data on
behalf of data owners; for example third party data
mining or collaborative data mining. The involve-
ment of third parties has clear security risks associ-
ated with it, such as unauthorised data access (data
leakage) and issues concerning data privacy preser-
vation. One current solution is Privacy Preserving
Data Mining (PPDM) [Agrawal and Srikant, 2000,
Lindell and Pinkas, 2002]. The typical approach
is to conceal sensitive data attributes by apply-
ing some form of data transformation to gen-
erate “sanitised” counterpart attribute values that
can be safely disclosed to (untrusted) third parties
[Chhinkaniwala and Garg, 2011]. Well known trans-
formation techniques include value perturbation and
data anonymisation [Chhinkaniwala and Garg, 2011].
Such techniques tend to operate by introducing “sta-
tistical noise” to either the entire dataset or to selected
sensitive attributes. An issue with these techniques
is that they cannot guarantee data confidentiality; it
might still be possible to “reverse engineer” the orig-
inal data [Vaidya et al., 2006, Berinato, 2015].
Data confidentiality, and protection against leak-
age, can be assured using data encryption. However,
standard forms of encryption do not support data min-
ing activities, which typically require data manipula-
tion and record comparison. A potential solution is
the use of Homomorphic Encryption (HE) schemes
that provide malleability properties that permit lim-
ited calculation over cyphertexts without compromis-
ing security. Although HE schemes support primitive
operations that go some way to supporting data min-
ing, they do not provide an entire solution. For exam-
ple they do not support record comparison; a require-
ment with respect to many data mining algorithms.
One mechanism whereby this can be addressed is to
involve data owners so that the operations that a given
HE scheme does not support can be performed by
the data owners [Erkin et al., 2009, Liu et al., 2014].
For example, in the context of data clustering, record
similarity checking can be conducted in this manner.
However, the degree of data owner involvement can
be substantial given any kind of sophisticated data
analysis task, which in turn detracts from the vision
of third party data mining.
There has been some work that seeks to dimin-
ish data owner participation with respect to third party
data clustering. Of note is the 3-D Updatable Distance
Matrix (UDM) introduced in [Almutairi et al., 2017].
However, use of the UDM featured two disadvan-
tages: (i) a substantial memory requirement, because
the first two dimensions of the matrix were correlated
to the number of records in the given dataset thus
limiting the scalability and (ii) the potential for re-
verse engineer given that a UDM is essentially a (very
large) set of linear equations.
Given the above, this paper proposes the idea of
the Secure Chain Distance Matrix (SCDM) which
provides for secure third party data mining us-
ing a proposed Order Preserving Encryption (OPE)
scheme, which can limit recourse to data own-
ers during the processing of the data (depend-
ing on the nature of clustering) and features none
of the memory requirement and security disadvan-
tages associated with the UDM concept proposed in
[Almutairi et al., 2017]. The novel elements of the
SCDM concept are firstly the chaining mechanism
used, which means that the storage requirement, com-
pared with UDMs, is reduced by a factor equivalent to
the number of input data records (−1). Secondly, the
proposed Order Preserving Encryption (OPE) scheme
with which the matrix is encoded, thus allowing for
third party record comparison without the risk of po-
tential reverse engineering as in the case of UDM.
The SCDM concept is fully described and evaluated.
The evaluation is conducted in the context of three
different clustering algorithms (Nearest Neighbour,
DBSCAN and k-Means), however, the SCDM idea
clearly has wider application.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 provides a review of related research. Sec-
tion 3 presents the data encryption schemes used to
provide for proposed secure clustering methods. The
proposed Secure Chain Distance Matrix (SCDM) idea
is then detailed in Section 4. The utilisation of the
SCDM concept, in the context of secure data cluster-
ing, is presented in Section 5. Section 6 then reports
on the experiments conducted to evaluate the SCDM
concept and the results obtained (in the context of se-
cure data clustering). The paper is concluded in Sec-
tion 7, with a summary of the main findings and sug-
gestion for future work.
2 PREVIOUS WORK
This section presents a review of previous work
on secure data clustering that uses HE schemes as a
data confidentiality preservation method. The main
challenge of HE-based privacy preserving data clus-
tering (and other forms of data mining), is that HE
schemes support only a limited number of operations.
Several solutions have been proposed to address this
challenge, mostly in the context of collaborative data
clustering whereas the work presented in this paper
is directed at third party data clustering, which can
be broadly categorised into: (i) involving data own-
ers when unsupported operations are required, and (ii)
utilising the concept of “secret sharing” to delegate a
key and operations to semi-honest and non-colluding
parties that collaboratively perform operations on the
data owners’ behalf. Both have limitations in term of
communication complexity and security threats.
The main feature of the first category is the main-
tenance of data confidentiality by allowing a third
party to only manipulate cyphertexts using HE prop-
erties (no access to any secret key). In this case, in
the context of data clustering, data owner participa-
tion becomes a necessity. In some cases, the majority
of the work is done by data owners. For example,
a number of authors have proposed mechanisms for
k-means clustering using Secure Multi-Party Compu-
tation (SMPC), where data owners repeatedly cluster
their own data and only share encrypted data centroids
so that an eventual global clustering can be arrived at
[Jha et al., 2005, Mittal et al., 2014]. A similar idea
is used in [Tong et al., 2018] to implement DBSCAN
where data owners independently apply DBSCAN on
their local data. The resulting boundary records and
their labels are then shared (in plaintext) with the third
party who then determines global boundary records
which are returned to the individual data owner so that
they can update their local clusters. However, shar-
ing boundary data records in plaintext form presents
a security threat. Secure nearest neighbour cluster-
ing is presented in [Shaneck et al., 2009] using SMPC
primitives; secure product for distance calculation
and Yao’s millionaires’ protocol for data comparison.
A significant drawback of these proposed solutions
is that they introduce a computation/communication
overhead because of the amount of data owner partic-
ipation required.
In [Erkin et al., 2009, Liu et al., 2014,
Almutairi et al., 2017, Rahman et al., 2017] the
basic idea was for the third party to do as much
of the clustering as possible (centroid calculation,
data aggregation and so), using the properties of a
selected HE scheme, and involve data owners only
when the properties of the particular HE scheme used
do not support the desired analysis. For example,
in the case of [Erkin et al., 2009], in the context of
collaborative clustering, the adopted HE scheme
does not support record similarity checking, thus
this is done by a randomly selected data owner.
The number of data owner participation instances
is given by n × |C| × i, where n is the number
of records, |C| the number of centroids and i the
number of clustering iterations; thus the amount of
data owner participation is considerable. The concept
of “trapdoors” are used to minimise the number
of data owner participation in [Liu et al., 2014].
“Static” and “dynamic” trapdoors were therefore
calculated by the data owners so as to convert
cyphertexts to order cyphertexts; consequently off-
line comparison (without data owner participation)
was supported. However, the main issue with this
approach was that it was very inefficient, particularly
when considering large datasets; in addition data
owner participation could still be high (depending on
the nature of the clustering) because of the need to
recalculate the dynamic trapdoors on each iteration.
An alternative is the UDM concept presented in
[Almutairi et al., 2017] that dramatically reduces the
data owner participation overhead to |C|× i, however
this also has limitations; firstly in terms of security
in that a UDM represents a set of linear equations
that might be reverse engineered (although the set
of linear equations is very large), and secondly in
terms of memory requirement and communication
complexity cost in that the size of a UDM increases
exponentially with the number of records in the input
dataset. The third party collaborative DBSCAN
mechanism described in [Rahman et al., 2017] uses
HE properties to calculate the required distances.
However, as noted previously, the generated cyphers
do not preserve the data ordering, thus data owner
participation was still required to determine whether
the distances were below or above the DBSCAN
threshold  value.
The second category comprises more recent work
that uses “secret sharing” to eliminate data owner
participation. The basic idea is to use a scheme,
as in [Hazay et al., 2012], that mathematically splits
a secret key among multiple semi-honest and non-
colluding parties that collaboratively manipulate data
on behalf of data owners. In [Rao et al., 2015,
Samanthula et al., 2015], the concept of secret shar-
ing was used to design secure computation proto-
cols that securely execute mathematical operations by
third parties without involving data owners in the data
mining process. The limitation of this approach is
that it tends to be inefficient and not practical for large
datasets. In addition, the requirement for at least two
semi-honest and none-colluding parties is of concern,
and for many data owners a security risk. Moreover,
the secret key that has been generated to encrypt a
given dataset cannot be revoked by data owners, thus
a version of the data needs to be stored locally by each
individual data owners.
3 DATA ENCRYPTION
The proposed Secure Chain Distance Matrix
(SCDM) based clustering approaches utilised two en-
cryption schemes: (i) Liu’s HE scheme [Liu, 2013]
and (ii) a proposed Order Preserving Encryption
(OPE). The first is used to encrypt the data to be out-
sourced, the second to encrypt the CDM. Both are
discussed in further detail in the following two sub-
sections, Sub-sections 3.1 and 3.2 respectively.
3.1 Liu’s Homomorphic Encryption
Scheme
In Liu’s scheme each data attribute v is encrypted
into m sub-cyphers, C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} where
m ≥ 3. Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code for the
Encrypt(v,K(m)) where K(m) is a list of secret
keys. K(m) = [(k1, s1, t1), ..., (km, sm, tm)] and ki,
si and ti are real numbers. Given a set of sub-cyphers
C = c1, ..., cm and the key K(m) Algorithm 2 gives
the pseudo code for the Decrypt(C,K(m)) decryp-
tion function to return the value v.
Algorithm 1 Encrypt(v, K(m))
1: procedure ENCRYPT(v,K(m))
2: generate m arbitrarily real random numbers
r1, ....., rm
3: Declare C as a real value array of m elements
4: c1 = k1 ∗ t1 ∗ v + s1 ∗ rm + k1 ∗ (r1 − rm−1)
5: for i = 2 to m− 1 do
6: ci = ki ∗ ti ∗ v + si ∗ rm + ki ∗ (ri − ri−1)
7: cm = (km + sm + tm) ∗ rm
8: Exit with C
Algorithm 2 Decrypt(C, K(m))
1: procedure DECRYPT(C,K(m))
2: T =
∑m−1
i=1 ti
3: S = cm/(km + sm + tm)
4: v = (
∑m−1
i=1 (ci − S ∗ si)/ki)/T
5: Exit with v
The scheme has both security and homomorphic
properties. The scheme is semantically secure in that
it produces different cyphertexts for the same plain-
text on each occasion, even when the same secret key
is used. Further detail regarding the security of Liu’s
scheme is given in Section 6. In terms of its homo-
morphic properties the scheme supports: the addition
of cyphertexts ⊕ and multiplication of a cyphertext
with a real value ⊗ as shown in Equation 1. Hence
the subtraction 	 of cyphertexts and the division 
of a cyphertexts by a real value are implemented as
given in Equation 2.
C ⊕ C′ = {c1 ⊕ c′1, . . . , cm ⊕ c′m} = v + v′
r ⊗ C = {r ⊗ c1, . . . , r ⊗ cm} = r × v (1)
C 	 C′ = C ⊕ (−1⊗ C′)
C  r = 1
r
⊗ C (2)
3.2 Order Preserving Encryption
A Chain Distance Matrix (CDM) holds distances be-
tween every attribute value in each consecutive data
record according to whatever ordering is featured in
the data; further detail regarding the generation of
CDMs is given in Section 4. As in the case of the
UDM, the content of a CDM can be used to de-
fine a set of linear equations that might allow for
re-engineering. To prevent such re-engineering the
idea is to encode the CDM, to give a Secure CDM
(SCDM), by using an Order Preserving Encryption
(OPE) scheme, a form of encryption where the order-
ing of the values is maintained so as to allow (secure)
comparison.
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Figure 1: Message and extended cypher space splitting
The proposed scheme is an amalgamation of two
existing OPE schemes, that of [Liu et al., 2016] and
[Liu and Wang, 2013]. Using the proposed scheme
the expected message space M and the expanded
cypher space C is known in advance as in the case
of most OPE schemes. The expanded cypher space
should be much larger than the message space, |C| 
|M |. Using the proposed scheme M = [l, r) and
C = [l′, r′) where l and l′ are the minimum bound-
ary values and r and r′ are the maximum boundary
values (as demonstrated in Figure 1). The key fea-
ture of the proposed OPE scheme is that it obscures
any data distribution that might be included in the
generated cyphertexts using the concept of message
space splitting and non-linear cypher space expan-
sion. To generate the desired cypher space the first
step is to randomly split the message space M into n
successive intervals M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} where
mi = [li, ri) ∀(i = 1, 2, . . . , n). The process of
splitting satisfies the following: M = ∪i=ni=1mi =
∪i=ni=1 [li, ri) = [l, r) and [li, ri)∩ [lj , rj) = φ ∀ i 6= j.
Next, the cypher space C was also split into n succes-
sive intervals C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn}. The length of the
cypher space intervals are determined by the density
of the corresponding message space interval, so that
for a dense interval, containing high frequency data,
its corresponding cypher space interval will result in
a longer cypher interval range.
Each interval has associated with it an encryption
function that maps data from the message space mi
to cyphertext in the corresponding extended cypher
space ci. In context of the work presented in this
paper, the encryption function of the ith interval is
shown in Algorithm 3; the algorithm encrypts a plain-
text value x ∈ mi to an encrypted value x′ ∈ ci.
Range and Range′ (lines 2 and 3) return the maxi-
mal and minimal value for the message space inter-
val mi and the corresponding cypher space ci respec-
tively. In line 4 the Scalei value is calculated as a
division of the cypher space size over the correspond-
ing message space size. The values of the minimal
cypher space, minimal message space and the scale
are used to generate a cypher x′ (line 5). To obfuscate
the occurrence frequency of a data value a random
value δi is applied to x′ (lines 6 and 7). The value
of δi is sampled from the range [0, Sens ∗ Scalei)
where Sens represents the data sensitivity as pro-
posed in [Liu and Wang, 2013]; the minimum dis-
tance between plaintext values.
Algorithm 3 Order Preserving Encryption algorithm
1: procedure ENCi(x, Sens)
2: li, ri ← Range(i)
3: l′i, r
′
i ← Range′(i)
4: Scalei =
(l′i−r′i)
(li−ri)
5: x′ = l′i + Scalei × (x− li)
6: δi = Random(0, Sens× Scalei)
7: x′ = x′ + δi
8: Exit with x′
4 THE SECURE CHAIN
DISTANCE MATRIX (SCDM)
Regardless of whether standard or HE encryption
is used, data encryption randomly transfers plaintexts
values in a dataset D to cyphertexts in such a way
that any ordering is not preserved. Therefore, data
comparisons cannot be directly applied to the cypher-
texts, and hence clustering algorithms cannot be di-
rectly applied. The proposed idea is to support third
party secure clustering over encrypted data using the
concept of a Secure Chain Distance Matrix (SCDM)
that holds the distance between every attribute in ev-
ery consecutive data records in D. An SCDM is a 2D
matrix whose first dimension is n − 1 where n is the
number of records in D and whose second dimension
is |A| (the size of the attribute set A). An SCDM is
generated in two steps: (i) CDM calculation and (ii)
CDM encryption. Algorithm 4 gives the CDM cal-
culation process. Instead of calculating distances be-
tween attribute values in records with the correspond-
ing attribute values in every other record, as in the
case of UDMs, a CDM holds only distances between
n − 1 records. This small set of distances allows a
third party to calculate the “order” of similarity be-
tween any two data records rx and ry (where x < y)
in D as per equation 3. In the case of x = y the dis-
tance will clearly be 0.
Algorithm 4 Chain Distance Matrix Calculation
1: procedure CDMCALCULATION(D)
2: CDM = ∅ array of n− 1 rows and |A| column
3: for i = 1 to i = n− 1 do
4: for j = 1 to j = |A| do
5: CDM[i,j] = D[i,j] −D[i+1,j]
6: Exit with CDM
Sim(CDM, rx, ry) =
j=|A|∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
i=(y−1)∑
i=x
CDM[i,j]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (3)
Although the CDM reduces the memory require-
ment, compared to UDM, it still essentially com-
prises a set of linear equations that may support re-
engineering. Therefore, the second step is to encrypt
the matrix so that the distance ordering is preserved
to give an SCDM. To this end, the OPE described in
Sub-section 3.2 above was used. The key feature of
the encrypted CDM, the SCDM, is that a third party
now has access to the distance value ordering, not
the original distance values, between the data records.
The order of similarity is determined as per Equation
3 but with the CDM replaced by the SCDM.
5 SECURE DATA CLUSTERING
This section presents a number of examples se-
cure clustering algorithms that operate over HE data
and utilise the SCDM concept, two of these achieve
the ideal solution (require no data owner participa-
tion whilst the third party processing is taking place),
the third only requires minimal data owner participa-
tion. Whatever the case the clustering process has two
parts, data preparation (Sub-section 5.1) and the data
clustering (Sub-sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4), conducted
by a data owner and the third party data miner respec-
tively.
5.1 Data Preparation
The initial step in the preparation process is to trans-
late a given dataset D into a suitable format that al-
lows distance calculation and data comparison. In the
context of the work presented in this paper, casting
is used to transfer categorical values to discrete inte-
ger equivalents. The next step is to encrypt the data
attribute values to produce an encrypted dataset D′
using Liu’s HE scheme and m = 4 (see Sub-section
3.1). The CDM is then calculated using Algorithm 4
and encoded using the proposed OPE scheme (Sub-
Section 3.2). The output from the preparation process
is the encrypted dataset D′ and the SCDM ready to
be sent to the third party data miner.
5.2 Secure Nearest Neighbour
Clustering (SNNC)
The proposed SCDM concept was combined with
three popular clustering schemes: (i) Nearest Neigh-
bour Clustering, (ii) DBSCAN and (iii) k-Means. The
first is discussed in this section, and the remaining two
in the following two sections. The pseudo code for the
proposed SNNC approach is presented in Algorithm
5, it operates in a similar manner to the standard NNC
algorithm [Cover and Hart, 1967]. The main differ-
ences are that the data and threshold values σ′ is en-
crypted and that the similarity between data records
is determined using the SCDM. The algorithm com-
mences by adding the first encrypted record r′1 to the
first cluster (lines 2 and 3) and then iteratively cluster-
ing the remaining records (lines 5 to 11). As in case of
standard NNC, a record r′i will be assigned to a cluster
if there exists some record r′m whose distance from r
′
i
is less than or equal to σ′ (lines 5 to 8). If there is
no such record, r′i is assigned to a new cluster (lines
10 and 11). The similarity between records r′i and r
′
m
is determined using Equation 3 (and the SCDM). The
algorithm will exit with a cluster configuration C.
5.3 Secure DBSCAN (SDBSCAN)
The SDBSCAN algorithm is presented in Algorithm
6. The inputs are the encrypted datasetD′ and SCDM
previously provided by the data owner and the desired
density parameters (MinPts, ′). Similar to the stan-
dard DBSCAN [Ester et al., 1996], density is defined
as the minimum number of points, MinPts, within
Algorithm 5 Secure NN clustering algorithm
1: procedure SNNC(D′, SCDM,σ′)
2: C1 = {r′1}
3: C = {C1}
4: k = 1
5: for i = 2 to i = |D′| do
6: Find r′m in some cluster inC where
Sim(SCDM, r′i, r
′
m) is minimised
7: if Sim(SCDM, r′i, r′m) ≤ σ′ then . (Eq. 3)
8: Cm = Cm ∪ r′i
9: else
10: k ++
11: Ck = {r′i}
12: Exit with C
a certain distance . Note that, in case of SDBSCAN
the  value is encrypted using the OPE scheme to give
′ that allows secure comparison and hides the corre-
lation (distance) between data records when the third
party data miner executes SDBSCAN.
The algorithm commences by initialising the
global variables MinPts, ′, SCDM and D′ by the
values received from the data owner (line 5). In line
6, an empty set of clusters C is created and the num-
ber of clusters so far is set to 0. For each record r′i
in D′ that has not been previously assigned to a clus-
ter, “unclustered”, the set S is determined. The set
S is the -neighbourhood of r′i and comprises the set
of records in D′ whose distance from r′i is less than
or equals to ′. The set is determined by calling the
regionQuery procedure (line 9) where the SCDM
is used to determine the overall distances between
records (see Equation 3). If the number of records in
S is greater than or equals to MinPts the density re-
quirement is satisfied thus r′i is marked as “clustered”
and considered to represent a new cluster Ck (lines 11
to 13). This cluster is then expanded by considering
the records in S using the expandCluster procedure
called in line 14. The input to the expandCluster
procedure is: the cluster Ck so far and the set S. The
expandCluster procedure is a recursive procedure.
For each record in S which has not been previously
clustered we add the record to Ck and then determine
the -neighbourhood S2 for this record (line 22). If
the size of S2 is greater than or equals to MinPts
we call the expandCluster procedure again and so
on until all the records in D′ are processed at which
point the algorithm will exist with the cluster config-
uration C.
5.4 Secure k-Means (Sk-Means)
The secure k-Means process is again very
similar to the standard k-Means algorithm
Algorithm 6 Secure DBSCAN clustering algorithm
1: global variables
2: MinPts, ′, SCDM , D′
3: end global variables
4: procedure SDBSCAN(D′, SCDM , MinPts, ′)
5: Initialized global variables with received values
6: C = ∅, k = 0
7: for i = 1 to i = |D′| do
8: if r′i is Unclustered then
9: S = regionQuery(ri)
10: if |S| >MinPts then
11: mark r′i as clustered
12: k = k + 1
13: Ck = r′i
14: Ck = expandCluster(Ck, S)
15: C = C ∪ Ck
16: Exit with C
17: procedure EXPANDCLUSTER(C,S)
18: for ∀ r′i ∈ S do
19: if r′i is Unclustered then
20: mark r′i as clustered
21: C = C ∪ r′i
22: S2 = regionQuery(ri)
23: if |S2| >MinPts then
24: C = expandCluster(C, S2)
25: Exit with C
26: procedure REGIONQUERY(r′Index)
27: N = empty set
28: for ∀ r′j ∈ D do
29: distance = Sim(SCDM, r′Index, r
′
j) . (Eq. 3)
30: if distance ≤ ′ then
31: N.add(r′j)
32: Exit with N
[MacQueen et al., 1967]. However, the mathe-
matical operations are replaced with equivalent
secure operations using the HE properties as pre-
sented in Sub-section 3.1. The pseudo code is given
in Algorithm 7. The inputs are the encrypted dataset
D′, the SCDM and number of desired clusters k.
The algorithm commences by: initialising the global
variables (line 5), dimensioning the cluster array
C = {C1, C2, . . . , Ck} and assigning the first k
encrypted records to it (lines 6 and 7). A centroid set
Cent = {cent1, cent2, . . . , centk} is thus defined
to hold the current centroids (lines 8 and 9). The
remaining encrypted data records are then assigned
to a cluster according to their similarity with respect
to the cluster centroids using the populateClusters
procedure (called from line 10) and given at the
end of algorithm. In populateClusters the order of
similarity is calculated using the SCDM as shown in
Equation 3. A set of new centroids (Cent′) are then
calculated (line 11) using the HE properties of Liu’s
scheme. An iterative loop is then entered (lines 12
to 19) that repeats until stable centroids are arrived
at. The first step of each k-Means iteration is to
calculate the Shift matrix S (line 13) that represents
the distances between the previous iteration centroids
(Cent) and the newly calculated centroids (Cent′).
Note that S, is calculated using the HE properties,
over the HE data ,therefore, the next step requires
recourse to the data owner (lines 14) to decrypt
matrix (S) and re-encrypt it using OPE to give S′ so
that it can be used to update the SCDM (line 15).
The algorithm will use S′ to update the SCDM by
concatenating the k elements in S′ to SCDM (line
15). In the following iteration S′ is used to update
the first k elements in the SCDM. Using the newly
calculated centroids all records are again assigned to
each cluster, using the populateClusters procedure,
in the same manner as before; and so on until a fixed
configuration is reached.
Algorithm 7 Secure k-Means clustering algorithm
1: global variables
2: D′, SCDM
3: end global variables
4: procedure SK-MEANS(D′, SCDM , k)
5: Initialized global variables with received values
6: C = Set of k empty clusters
7: Assign first k records in D′ to C (one per cluster)
8: Cent = Set of k cluster centroids
9: Assign first K records in D′ to Cent
10: C = PopulateClusters(k + 1, C, Cent)
11: Cent′ = CalculateCentroids(C)
12: while Cent 6= Cent′ do
13: S = Cent	 Cent′
14: S′ = S decrypted and encrypt result using OPE
15: SCDM = SCDM + S′
16: C = Set of k empty clusters
17: C = PopulateClusters(1, C, Cent′)
18: Cent = Cent′
19: Cent′ = CalculateCentroids(C)
20: Exit with C
21: procedure POPULATECLUSTERS(x,C,Cent)
22: id = null
23: for x = x to x = |D′| do
24: for y = 1 to y = |C| do
25: sim = Sim(SCDM, rx, cy) . (Eq. 3)
26: id = cluster identifier with lowest sim
value so far
27: Cid = Cid ∪ rx (Cid ∈ C)
28: Exit with C
6 EVALUATION
The evaluation of the proposed clustering ap-
proaches is presented in this section. For the purpose
of the evaluation fifteen datasets from the UCI data
repository [Lichman, 2013] were selected in a man-
ner so that datasets of a variety of sizes and differ-
ent numbers of classes could be considered (these are
listed in columns 2 and 3 of Table 1). The number of
classes in each case was used as the value for k in the
case of k-Means clustering. The proposed approaches
were implemented using the Java programming lan-
guage. The overall objective was to evaluate the pro-
posed algorithms in term of: (i) data owner partici-
pation, (ii) scalability, (iii) clustering efficiency, (iv)
clustering accuracy and (v) security.
Data owner participation was measured in terms
of the runtime required for data preparation and
SCDM generation, and the amount of data owner in-
volvement during the clustering process. Preparation
time results are presented in Table 1 where columns
4, 7 and 8 give the preparation times for: data en-
cryption, CDM calculation and CDM encryption re-
spectively. From the table, it can be seen that negli-
gible time was required for the data preparation; even
with respect to the largest dataset, Arrhythmia. For
SDBSCAN and SNNC no further data owner partici-
pation was required, whereas in the case of Sk-Means
the participation was limited to the decryption and re-
encryption of the shift matrix, S, on each iteration;
thus data owner participation was limited to O(|C| ×
i), where |C| is the number of centroids and i is the
number of k-Means iterations, the same as in the case
of the UDM approach from [Almutairi et al., 2017].
The chain feature in SCDM reduces the required
memory resources compared to the UDM concept in
[Almutairi et al., 2017]. The number of elements in
a UDM grows exponentially with the data volume;
more formally it equals to (n(n+1)2 × |A|)) (Column
6 in Table 1 gives the number of UDM elements for
each experimental dataset). The SCDM is more com-
pact and hence requires significant lower resource
(Column 9 in Table 1) which makes it more appro-
priate for big data. This small number of elements
means that the time required to calculate an SCDM is
less than the UDM (as shown in Columns 5 and 7 in
Table 1).
In terms of clustering efficiency, the runtime to
cluster the data using the proposed secure clustering
mechanisms was compared with the standard equiv-
alent processes. The runtime results are presented
in Figure 2. From the figure, it can be seen that the
overall runtimes required for the secure clustering ap-
proaches, as expected, were longer than in the case
of standard approaches, however, inspection of the
recorded results indicates that this did not present a
significant overhead. Of course, the bigger the dataset
the larger the SCDM, and consequently the greater
the time required to interact with the SCDM to clus-
ter data.
Num Data UDM UDM CDM CDM CDM σ k Min 
No. Dataset R× C Class Encrypt. Cal. Size Cal. Encrypt. Size Pts
Labels (MSec) (MSec) (MSec) (MSec)
1. Arrhythmia 452×279 16 11.08 218.5 28563462 3.33 136.09 125829 1 16 2 600
2. Banknote Authent. 1372×4 2 1.24 81.5 3767512 0.2 32.08 5484 5 2 2 3
3. Blood transfusion 748×4 2 0.73 28.2 1120504 0.13 20.17 2988 68 2 2 10
4. Brest Cancer 699×9 2 1.64 31.6 2201850 0.19 27.36 6282 10 2 2 5
5. Breast Tissue 106×9 6 0.36 2.1 51039 0.03 23.73 945 1 6 2 100
6. Chronic Kidney Dis. 400×24 2 1.56 20.2 1924800 0.28 37.38 9576 100 2 2 70
7. Dermatology 366×34 6 1.88 22.9 2283474 0.43 31.77 12410 18 6 2 10
8. Ecoli 336×7 8 0.98 7.8 396312 0.09 31.54 2345 1 8 3 60
9. Ind. Liver Patient 583×10 2 0.99 23.3 1702360 0.15 39.39 5820 99 2 3 40
10. Iris 150× 4 3 0.24 2.9 45300 0.04 17.87 596 1 3 5 2
11. Libras Movement 360×90 15 4.01 50.3 5848200 1.26 92.07 32310 4 15 5 5
12. Lung cancer 32×56 3 0.61 1 29568 0.05 13.34 1736 1 3 2 20
13. Parkinsons 195×22 2 1.01 6.1 420420 0.13 36 4268 73 2 3 10
14. Pima Ind. Diabetes 768×8 2 1.18 36.6 2362368 0.18 37.18 6136 100 2 5 20
15. Seeds 210×7 3 0.51 4.8 155085 0.06 26.77 1463 1 3 5 1
Table 1: Run times for data owner data preparation and algorithm operating statistics
No.
Standard DBSCAN SDBSCAN Standard NNC SNNC Standard k-Means Sk-Means
Num. Sil. Num. Sil. Num. Sil. Num. Sil. Iter. Sil. Iter. Sil.
Clus. Coef Clus. Coef Clus. Coef Clus. Coef Coef Coef
1. 6 0.472 6 0.472 452 1.00 452 1 .00 10 0.536 10 0.536
2. 7 0.922 7 0.922 21 0.895 21 0.895 16 0.407 16 0.407
3. 27 0.971 33 0.976 34 0.999 35 0.999 12 0.595 12 0.595
4. 4 0.678 1 0.485 108 0.903 135 0.926 3 0.515 3 0.515
5. 3 0.628 3 0.628 105 1.00 105 1.00 18 0.984 18 0.984
6. 19 0.970 19 0.970 243 0.999 243 0.999 8 0.723 8 0.723
7. 16 0.853 15 0.881 32 0.919 37 0.915 15 0.744 9 0.713
8. 1 -1 .000 1 -1 .000 2 0.353 2 0.353 23 0.628 14 0.631
9. 7 0.789 7 0.789 100 0.997 100 0.997 13 0.569 13 0.569
10. 2 0.722 2 0.722 15 0.922 16 0.927 14 0.789 14 0.789
11. 11 0.715 11 0.715 224 0.969 224 0.969 18 0.557 18 0.557
12. 1 0.053 1 0.053 32 1.00 32 1.00 8 0.146 3 0.076
13. 5 0.829 5 0.829 11 0.953 11 0.953 7 0.406 7 0.406
14. 4 0.691 4 0.691 22 0.956 22 0.956 8 0.485 8 0.485
15. 7 0.852 7 0.852 103 0.979 103 0.979 6 0.681 6 0.681
Table 2: Cluster configuration comparison using standard and secure algorithms (differing results highlighted in bold font)
In terms of accuracy, cluster configuration “cor-
rectness” was measured by comparing the results
obtained with those obtained using standard (unen-
crypted) clustering algorithm equivalents. The pa-
rameters used (in practice selected by the data owner)
are given in columns 10 to 13 of Table 1. The accu-
racy metric used was the Silhouette Coefficient (Sil.
Coef.) [Rousseeuw, 1987], a real number value be-
tween −1 and +1, the closer the value is to 1 the bet-
ter the clustering. The results obtained are presented
in Table 2. From the table, it can be seen that the clus-
ter configurations produced using the proposed secure
algorithms were the same in 35 of the 45 cases (same
number of clusters). Where the configurations were
different, in one case the Sil. Coef. value was the
same, in the remaining nine cases the Sil. Coef. value
using the secure clustering was better in five of the
nine occasions. The reason for the different configu-
rations sometimes obtained was the nature of the pro-
posed OPE scheme; although ensuring that the CDM
was secure against Statistical Attacks and Cypher-
text Only Attacks by producing different cyphertext
for the same plaintext, usage of the OPE scheme did
sometimes affect the nature of the clustering because
equality is not preserved. Consequently different Sil.
Coef. values were sometimes produced in these cases,
although in most cases these differences were not sig-
nificant.
The security of the proposed clustering relies on
the security of: (i) Liu’s scheme used to encrypt the
raw data and (ii) the proposed OPE scheme used to
encrypt the CDM. Liu’s scheme has been shown to
be semantically secure [Liu, 2013]; given any cypher-
text C within a message m the ability of an adversary
to determine any partial information concerning the
message will be negligible in terms of the input, hence
the scheme is “probably secure”. In other words, it
will be computationally expensive to derive informa-
tion concerning the encrypted plaintext given only the
cyphertexts and the corresponding encryption public
key. This feature makes the proposed method se-
cure against Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA) and con-
sequently secure against Knowing Plaintext Attack
(KPA) and Cyphertext Only Attack (COA). More-
over, once the data is encrypted and outsourced to a
third party data miner, using the proposed approaches,
no decryption takes place at the third party side which
implies even more security. In terms of the pro-
posed OPE scheme, preserving the order of gener-
ated cyphertexts raises a threat of Cyphertext Only
Attacks (COAs) that use statistical features, assum-
ing that the data distribution is known. Therefore, the
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Figure 2: Comparison of run times using standard and secure clustering algorithms (NNC, DBSCAN and k-means)
adopted OPE mechanism utilises the concept of “mes-
sage space splitting” and “non-linear cypher space ex-
pansion” to obscure the data distribution in the gener-
ated cyphertexts, thus protecting against COAs. Fur-
thermore, the encryption function has a one-to-many
mapping feature that produces different cyphertexts
for the same plaintext value even when the same keys
are used; this makes it harder to derive any informa-
tion from inspecting the cyphertexts.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper a secure clustering mechanisms has
been proposed using the idea of an SCDM. The us-
age of the SCDM was illustrated in the context of
three clustering approaches: (i) Secure DBSCAN,
(ii) Secure Nearest Neighbour and (iii) Secure k-
Means. The advantages offered by the SCDM are
firstly that it is compact and thus appropriate for large
datasets; the SCDM requires significantly lower re-
source in terms of memory and user interaction over-
head, compared to (say) the UDM concept presented
in [Almutairi et al., 2017]. Secondly, the proposed
OPE encryption provides an adequate level of security
against COA. Thirdly, compared to other proposed se-
cure clustering approaches, data owner participation
during the clustering process is zero with respect to
SDBSCAN and SNNC, and limited with respect to
Sk-Means. Evaluation was conducted, using fifteen
UCI datasets, by comparing the operation of the se-
cure clustering algorithms with their standard coun-
terparts. The evaluation demonstrated that the qual-
ity of the clustering was similar although not always
identical (sometimes better). The reason for the dif-
ferences was the random parameter δ added to OPE
cyphertext which made equality comparison impossi-
ble. The runtime, as was to be expected, was greater
with respect to secure clustering, but not significantly
so. For future work, the authors intend to develop a
“Super CDM” where the represented data belongs to
two or more data owners who do not wish to share
their data in an unencrypted form.
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